The Supreme Court’s ruling in The State of Tamil Nadu vs. The Governor of Tamil Nadu and Anr. has been hailed as a watershed moment in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. It not only resolves an escalating constitutional conflict but also reinforces the principle that constitutional functionaries must act within their defined roles. The judgment comes amid increasing instances of Governors stalling Bills passed by elected State legislatures — an issue that has troubled not only Tamil Nadu but also Kerala, Punjab, and Telangana.
The Background: Inaction and Constitutional Crisis
At the heart of the case lies the Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi’s prolonged delay — in some cases, years — in acting upon 10 Bills passed by the State Assembly. These Bills included legislations challenging gubernatorial control over public university appointments. After re-passing the Bills, the Assembly sent them again to the Governor. Instead of assenting or returning them, he referred them to the President of India — but only after the State approached the Supreme Court.
The President, in turn, withheld assent on most of the Bills without furnishing detailed reasoning. This unprecedented chain of events raised fundamental questions about the separation of powers and the functioning of India’s federal structure.
The Court’s Verdict: A Restoration of Constitutional Order
In a strongly worded judgment, Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan struck down the Governor’s and the President’s actions as unconstitutional. They invoked Article 142 — which empowers the Court to ensure “complete justice” — to deem the pending Bills as assented to.
Key Takeaways from the Judgment:
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Withholding Assent Is Not the End:
The Court reiterated its earlier view in State of Punjab vs. Governor of Punjab (2023) that when a Governor withholds assent under Article 200, he must return the Bill to the legislature for reconsideration. After reconsideration, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to assent to the Bill. -
Time Limits for Action:
The Court introduced a reasonable timeframe — a minimum of one month and a maximum of three months — within which the Governor or President must act on Bills. This move aims to prevent the abuse of inaction, or a “pocket veto,” by constitutional heads. -
No Absolute Discretion:
The Court rejected the argument that Governors or the President enjoy autonomous discretion in reserving or withholding assent. Such decisions must be based on the advice of the Council of Ministers, except in limited circumstances explicitly provided for in the Constitution. -
Judicial Review Is Applicable:
Critically, the Court affirmed that the Governor’s and President’s decisions under Articles 200 and 201 are subject to judicial review. Immunity under Article 361 does not extend to shielding unconstitutional action.
The Court’s Balancing Act
While critics have labelled the verdict as judicial overreach, particularly for using Article 142 to deem the Bills as passed, the Court avoided the even more confrontational path of issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor to assent. Recognising that contempt proceedings against a Governor are not viable, the Court opted for a practical, albeit extraordinary, remedy to uphold democratic governance.
Concerns and Contradictions: A Legal Tightrope
Though comprehensive, the judgment leaves certain ambiguities. For instance, it suggests that the Governor may withhold assent based on ministerial advice, only to send the Bill back for reconsideration — but the utility of this mechanism is questioned if the Assembly holds a clear majority and rejects the Governor’s suggestions. Moreover, different Benches have offered varying interpretations on the discretion available to Governors under Article 200, warranting eventual clarification by a larger Constitution Bench.
Response and Criticism
Kerala’s Governor and some legal voices have criticised the ruling as “judicial overreach,” arguing that fixing time limits is Parliament’s prerogative, not the judiciary’s. Others questioned whether such constitutional interpretations should come only from a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3). However, legal experts point out that the Court merely clarified — not amended — the Constitution, drawing upon settled principles of interpretation and federal accountability.
Larger Implications for Indian Federalism
This verdict arrives at a crucial time when centralisation of power and friction between the Union and States are intensifying. The judgment acts as a much-needed reaffirmation of India’s federal structure and the principles of cooperative federalism. It sends a strong message that unelected constitutional heads cannot subvert the democratic will of elected Assemblies.
The ruling also creates a template for other States — such as Kerala — which are facing similar delays in the passage of legislation. It may also lead to a legislative rethink about clearly codifying the timelines and procedures for assent to Bills to prevent future constitutional deadlocks.
Conclusion: Towards Structural Reform
By asserting that no constitutional authority is beyond judicial scrutiny and by placing reasoned limits on gubernatorial discretion, the Supreme Court has restored equilibrium in the functioning of Indian democracy. While the judgment may not resolve all questions, it unmistakably affirms one enduring truth — that in a democracy, the will of the people, expressed through their elected representatives, cannot be held hostage by constitutional ambiguity or inaction.
The time may be ripe to consider constitutional amendments that formally define procedures and timeframes for the assent process — to safeguard the spirit of democracy and prevent future institutional logjams. The April 8 verdict may well serve as the constitutional cue.